Prehistory

Ahmed Rashid suggested describing post-Soviet Central Asian geopolitical metamorphoses in terms of “The Great Game” – the symbolic name for the 19th century struggle between the British and the Russian empires for the domination over Eurasia (1). The clash of the great powers on the regional ground provided its essence, while local actors were assigned secondary status, though their policy was never absolutely predetermined.

On the eve of World War І the empires succeeded in balancing their relationship and further struggle followed absolutely different schemes. In 1920s Moscow managed to push the immediate battleground away from the region of Soviet Central Asia.  

But in 1980s the Soviet rule domination over some territories and lands previously being under control or friendly began to wane and since 1991 the position of the Russian Federation in Central Asia has resembled that of the Russian Empire in early 19^th century. A new “Great Game” against the West commenced, primarily over oil and gas deposits. Western oil and gas companies concentrated first on Kazakhstan in 1993-1994; then, in 1995-1997, on Azerbaijan; and in 1997-1999 on Turkmenistan. The current geopolitical scene of Central Asia is by no means limited to the former Soviet republics, but also comprises China, Afghan parties, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and, naturally, the countries of the West, first of all, the USA. Aleksei Malashenko of Moscow Carnegie Foundation speaks of a “square” within the four bounds of which “The Great Game” is played between the USA, the Russian Federation, China and regional countries, standing for the fourth “dotted” side of the square. (16)

2005 was another year of “The Great Game”, marked by the revolution in Kyrgyzstan, an uprising in Uzbekistan and the blossoming of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The shift in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan proved to be the most significant geopolitical change of the year. Daniel Kimmage opines that Central Asia “is increasingly losing its coherence as a geopolitical entity, with individual countries embarking on courses of development sufficiently disparate to render a "regional" perspective deeply problematic. Moreover, the domestic imperatives of these five courses of development are now the driving force, if not the only force, in relations with the outside world and its great powers” (4).

Let us concur with his view, although we should note that geopolitical units are interrelated only in ideological schemes. It is quite natural, that Sovietologist magazines ascribed to the countries of the region a definite geopolitical unity within the bounds of Soviet Central Asia. After 1991 “Soviet Central Asia”, as a geopolitical unit, gradually lost its former integrity, thrusted by Moscow. Today its unity is determined by other factors, for example, by post-Soviet authoritarianism or the social legacy of the USSR. 

The retreat of the US and temporary Russian reconquest

The common tendency of the regional development can be formulated as “Less freedom, more Russia”. Russia proceeds with its “reconquest” of Central Asia, both in an overtly political way (such is the case of Uzbekistan), and by employing secretive economic levers via Russian companies (in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan). Even the colour revolution in Kyrgyzstan presented no deviations from the general trend for it gave rise to the government evidently well-disposed towards Russia. The single country where Moscow failed to achieve any sizeable advance was Kazakhstan, possessing of vast potential to grow into a regional power. Its leader Nazarbayev stated his intention to place Kazakhstan amid 50 most developed countries of the world.

The United States had to abandon the region, which is likely to grow less important to it, because of the American troops’ leaving Afghanistan. The ambition of the USA to “re-format” the politics within the bounds of the USSR and to enhance the adoption of new Western standards in the countries of Central Asia enjoyed a spell of success in early 1990s. Now it is suffering one blow after another and the Western agencies and organisations are being stripped of the right to proceed with their activity in the region.

Throughout the previous year almost all Central Asian countries pursued with further restricting civil rights and freedoms. Tajikistan provides the most vivid example. Its president Rakhmonov has disposed of all of his influential political opponents and secured his variant of “directed democracy”. Today the only “non-directed” democratic regime exists in Kyrgyzstan, where the revolution toppled Akayev dictatorship. Still, no drastic reforms were undertaken by the new Kyrgyz government. That’s why, taking into consideration the Soviet ruling experience of the new Kyrgyz leaders and the underdevelopment of the country, one can hardly hope for the establishment of a consolidated democracy in Kyrgyzstan.

Western standards were repelled by the region. At the same time Central Asian rulers are cultivating fruitful cooperation with China, which is successfully promoting its concepts and standards all over the world, including the one of directed democracy in the sphere of public administration. China is creating the “Chinese” world everywhere it can, Central Asia included. The Chinese realm is for the time being able to come to an agreement with Russia over the issue of “directed democracy”. But it is exactly China that is predetermined to push Russia away from Central Asia, the plain truth is that the actual Chinese expansion has not yet commenced. The global expansion of the USA is perceived in all the spheres of life, it is connected with the spread of particular political standards in Pax Americana countries. The global expansion of any country has always followed a similar scenario, for such a large-scale process requires the embracement of all the spheres. The expansion of China won’t be any different, and as early as today we see it under way in a miniature version in the region of Central Asia.

Let us consider the peculiar features of every particular country’s development in 2005.

Kazakhstan 

On January, 4 2005 the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev was re-elected for another seven-year term receiving over 91% of the vote. Such an outcome, along with the violations during the electoral campaign revealed earlier, evoked much verbal criticism. “Unfortunately, despite some attempts to improve the electoral process, the authorities have not shown enough political will to conduct good elections”, declared Bruce Jones, the coordinator of OSCE, the Council of Europe and Europarliament observers’ activity. “The elections in Kazakhstan did not correspond to international standards”, stated the representative of the US Department of State Adam Erdeli, noting some improvement in the electoral process. (12) It is highly probable that Nazarbayev could have won even without falsifications, for, according to Gallop Institute and the International Republican Institute (USA), 83% of voters were ready to support him. (13)

The international community critique of Kazakhstan was rather mild. This is accounted for by the geopolitical status of the country as a major resource supplier, as well as hopes for the continuation of Nazarbayev’s “multivector” foreign policy.

Kazakhstan is rated 13^th in the world with respect to oil deposits. Today the country extracts annually about 60 million tons of oil, by 2010-2012 Kazakhstan plans to reach 100 million tons, the figure for 2015 goes as high as 150 million (16). With this perspective the world community can tolerate the present Kazakh political system, possessing of all the attributes of a post-Soviet “directed democracy”. A number of European politicians even mildly supported the ambition of Kazakhstan to head OSCE in 2009 (4).

The multivector character of Kazakh foreign policy was exhibited by further effort to diversify oil export routes, decreasing country’s dependence on Russia, and by the admission of Chinese investors to Kazakhstan’s energy sector. Well before May, 25, the date of export pipe line Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTD) was opened, Nazarbayev met Azerbaijan president Ilham Aliev on March, 1 during the latter’s visit to Kazakhstan. The Azerbaijan president proclaimed the overall readiness of his country to allow the transit of non-Azerbaijan oil via BTD. “I am sure that the pipe line will transfer Kazakh oil” – answered Nazarbayev. “In future thought should be given to Kazakhstan’s joining Baku-Erzurum project”. Kazakhstan representative voiced the intention to lay the under-water pipe line from the Kazakh port city of Aktau to Baku, so that “the Caucasus becomes for Kazakhstan an alternative pathway to international markets”. (15)

On January, 15 2005 the pipe line Atasu-Alashankou, linking Kazakhstan with China, was put into operation. The export of Kazakh oil to China is to begin in mid-2006. (4) In October 2005 China National Petroleum Corporation paid 4,2 billion dollars to purchase two-thirds of assets of PetroKazakhstan, which is one of the biggest Kazakh oil companies. Despite the fact, that the latter is registered in Canada, all of its production takes place in the territory of Kazakhstan. (17) and (18) The Indian company Oil and Natural Gas Corp. also sought to overtake PetroKazakhstan, but the Chinese company, having invested in Kazakhstan about 10 billion dollars since 1997, took the upper hand. (16)

The background for the abovementioned events were the high-flown declarations that strengthening Russian-Kazakh friendly relations was the priority of Kazakh foreign policy. (19) The symbolic amicability towards Russia was supplemented with no less symbolic backing United States – Kazakhstan went on keeping thirty sappers in Iraq. (4)

On the regional scene Kazakhstan took a pragmatic stance in cooperation with the neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In 2005 the relatively dynamic Kazakh economy still attracted hundreds of thousands workers from these two countries, which permitted Astana to mould its relationship with the neighbours from the position of strength. (4) Once again we can trace here multivector approach – 2005 saw spells of both rapprochement and estrangement in Kazakh relationship with its neighbours. Thus, in July Kazakhstan rejected to extradite to Uzbekistan Lutfullo Shamsiddinov, an Uzbek human rights champion from Andijon, eyewitness to the Andijon massacre. (14) But it is likely that in November the Kazakh authorities consented to several Uzbeks hiding in southern Kazakhstan being kidnapped and transported to Uzbekistan. (4)

The relationship with Kyrgyzstan developed in a similar way. Although the Kazakh governmental media provided the coverage of Kyrgyz revolution of March, 24 as chaos unravelled and despite the fact that several higher officials of former Akayev’s elite took refuge exactly in Kazakhstan, Kazakh government maintained close relationship with the new Bishkek administration. Kazakhstan pledged to cover the Kyrgyz natural gas deficit  in case any difficulty arises with Uzbek supplies because of Kyrgyz-Uzbek tensions in July, and prevented a clash with Kyrgyzstan on the issue of the latter’s indebtedness for gas supplies, reaching 18 million US dollars. (19) and (46)

Kyrgyzstan

In 1990s Kyrgyzstan stood out as the only true Central Asian democracy, but during the last decade it has drifted to other authoritarian regimes. Throughout this period of time the country with the highest number of political parties and the freest mass media in the region saw a step-by-step democracy and freedom decline. The symbol of political transformations in the country appeared to be the imprisonment of the opposition leader Felix Kulov in 2001, which was viewed by many human rights groups as politically motivated.

In 2005 Kyrgyzstan regained the image of the most democratic country in the region. The outcome of the February and March elections was the formation of a parliament absolutely loyal to president Akayev. But the elections caused a tide of resentment because of manipulations, and on March, 24 the Kyrgyz government was overthrown, Akayev fleeing to Russia. As a result of the uprising the opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev rose to power. As early as in June he was elected president of the country at the elections recognized to be the freest and the most transparent in the history of Central Asia. (4)

The collapse of the longstanding Akayev regime as a result of street action and coming to power of president Bakiyev and Prime-minister Kulov had little impact on the country’s foreign policy. Except for the conflict with Uzbekistan on the Andijon refugees, the new Kyrgyz authority managed domestic issues. 

The tense relationship with Uzbekistan stemmed from the fleeing of hundreds of refugees from this country to Kyrgyzstan after the Andijon events of May, 12-13. Uzbekistan claimed that there were terrorists among the fugitives and demanded for them to be extradited, while the Western countries suggested that they should be evacuated to the third country. By the end of June 439 Uzbek refugees were transported by air to Romania. Uzbekistan protested to it, but did not dare escalate the conflict.  

The two countries even succeeded to come to an agreement about supplying Uzbek gas to Kyrgyzstan. The latter has a debt to Kazakhstan for gas supplies, though in dealing with Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan is a prompt payer. (46)

The new authorities declared multivector foreign policy (20), though, in Andrei Babitsky’s opinion, “the foreign-policy moves of the new government signify that it is favouring a union with Russia” (21). Indeed, at the meeting with the Russian Minister of Defence, Bakiyev foretells: “Kyrgyzstan will always be with Russia, Russia is our №1 priority” (44). Kulov also makes no secret out of his pro-Russia views and openly stands for the wide usage of the Russian language in the country. (46)

At the summer SOC summit in Astana Bakiyev stated: “We can proceed to looking into the expediency of the US forces stay”. Political analyst Emil Djuraev considers that Kyrgyzstan would have never raised the issue of the American bases on its own and “that is a strategic, geopolitical step of Russia and China” (21). Such an intention of Kyrgyz government deserves special attention in view of the fact that the Americans did pay for operating their military base (though the shares of money payed to the owner of the private airport “Manas” and to Kyrgyz government remains a mystery), while Russians had their notorious for smuggling Kant base (48) for free, Kyrgyzstan even covered its public utilities costs (47). Besides, the economic aid of the USA to Kyrgyzstan, the training of Kyrgyz military men by the Americans and handing over to them several types of armament should be regarded as indirect payment for the base (23). 

In the end of June, during the visit of Donald Rumsfeld to Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz Minister of Defence stated that “the American air base will be situated in Kyrgyzstan so long as the situation in Afghanistan remains tense”, and Donald Rumsfeld made it clear that the USA were not planning to withdraw their troops for the time being. (22) In the end, both foreign military bases survived – that of the USA (in Manas) and the Russian one (in Kant).

After Uzbekistan ordered the USA to remove its Khanabad air base and Russian officials voiced their design to expand the Kant base, increase the military contingent and invest into military infrastructure (44), Bakiyev put it plainly at his meeting with Rumsfeld and Rice that he would like to raise the rent for the base near Bishkek, “the Kyrgyz economy is extremely weak. We need support. Time has come to review the terms of the agreement and raise the rent”. (45) But according to Kulov, the whole matter was about money rather than closing the base. Throughout the year the Kyrgyz authorities have several times promptly negated the possibility of establishing a Chinese military base in Kyrgyzstan. (4)

Tajikistan

Tajikistan has always been prominent among his neighbours as a country of vigorous political life, commencing at the beginning of 1990s with mass demonstrations leading to the resignation of the first post-Soviet ruler of the country Rahman Nabiyev. Following was the civil war of 1992-1997. The partisans of an Islam state (United Tajik opposition - UTA) struggled against the forces of the National Front (People’s Democratic Party), headed by Imom-ali Rakhmonov.

In contrast to “reach” Kazakhstan, “rebellious” Kyrgyzstan, “isolated” Turkmenistan and “troubled” Uzbekistan, the development of the events in Tajikistan after the civil war end in 1997 is not so easy to outline. Let us note the tendency to strengthen authoritarianism and the power of Rakhmonov, who is facing a task to win another presidential elections in November 2006. Rakhmonov keeps consolidating his regime, which was begun in July 2003 by conducting a shady referendum to see 93% of voters uphold a Constitutional amendment, permitting Rakhmonov to stand for two more terms – up to 2020 (7).

Tajik government has grown more intolerant towards opposition, several opposition activists were put to jail, though today Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country with no ban on the activity of Islam opposition. As “Nezavisimaya gazeta” puts it, “Tajikistan is undergoing the clearing of the political field”, which also started before 2005. The influential general Ghaffar Mirzoyev was arrested as early as in June 2004, prior to that many well-known and powerful supporters of the National Front (which once prevailed in the war and practically led Rakhmonov to power) were imprisoned or died.

UTA supporters were also increasingly driven away from rule. As it was laid down in the peaceful accord of 1997, UTA was guaranteed a 30 percent quota in the executive bodies. Despite that the opposition representatives have been gradually pushed away from state bureaucracy. In 2005 a single UTA minister remained in the government – that of emergency (2). Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, the leader of the oppositional Democratic Party and a reputed figure of the armed opposition at the time of the civil war, was sentenced in October to 23 years of imprisonment on the terrorism and corruption charge (3).

Rakhmonov’s opponents were hesitant. After the February parliamentary elections, showing that two-thirds of the vote was given to the followers of the president, some opposition parties called for declaring the election results unjust. But after their demands were ignored, the parties did not organise street protests. (8) It may have been the spectre of the civil war that kept them back. It seemed that both the government and the opposition were concerned about preserving the internal status quo.

The power of the authorities is augmenting, though the character of the state to be formed raises doubts about its conformity to democratic standards and the modern concept of a state. In answer to the criticism of international organisations concerning the unfairness of the elections Rakhmonov explained: “Democracy and democratic processes are not a game of chess… One has to bear in mind that we are Asians. Muslims constitute more than 90% of the population. One should not speed it all up” (8).

In 2005 the external ties of the region did not differ much from those of the previous years. The core geopolitical tendency in Tajikistan proved to be the realization of the agreements, reached by Tajik president Rakhmonov and Russian president Putin in October 2004. According to the agreements, Russia is to invest 2 to 4 billion dollars into Tajikistan, convert its 201^st motorised division, placed in Tajikistan for a long time, into a standing military base totalling to 6000 military men (19), and “Russkii Alyuminii” (RUSAL) decided to invest more than a billion dollars in the reconstruction of the already operating aluminium plant and building another one, as well as two new hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan. (9) and (10)

Taking into consideration the exceptional role of aluminium industry (its export revenue exceeds even that of cotton) and related to it power generation for Tajik state, its cessation to Russia has grave consequences for the future of the state. Against that background even the fact that on July, 14 2005 Russia completed placing the Tajik-Afghan border (along the whole length of it) under the control of Tajik frontier guard seems to wither (5). 

Close cooperation with Russia manifested itself in other spheres. Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, the leader of Democratic Party, was kidnapped in April in Moscow and in a month’s time appeared in a Dushanbe prison. Russia has earlier delivered up to Rakhmonov his political opponents, for example, in February 2004 the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jakub Salimov was extradited (2).

As per the relationship with the West, Rakhmonov declared that his country will never permit the US Army to place a military base in Tajikistan. (19) France has once again curtailed its military contingent here (4). The financial cooperation of Tajikistan with the West was limited to the contacts with international financial institutions. At the end of December the International Monetary Fund, according to which Tajikistan owes IMF 93 million dollars, included the country on the list of 19 countries whose debts will be written down in full.     

“Tajikistan is implementing economic reforms better than any other country with low income level”, stated the vice-president of the World Bank Francois Burgignon while visiting Dushanbe in January 2006. He also voiced the intention of the World Bank to write down Tajik indebtedness to this institution, which amounted to 307 million US dollars on January, 1 2005 (6).

According to IMF assessment, “Tajikistan has lately been slowly, but steadily moving towards market economy”. IMF notes, that Tajikistan has rapidly increased the speed of economic development during the last several year. Thus, GDP has shown a 10% increase from 2000 to 2004, the inflation rate has dropped from 40% in 2001 to 5,6% in 2004. (11)

Turkmenistan

The external contacts of Turkmenistan are to a large extent limited to the export of natural gas, and, in contrast to other countries of the region, do not hinge so grossly on the state of affairs within the country (so far there has been only one state of affairs). The current agreement of 2003 between Turkmenistan and Russia stipulates for the long-term supplies of Turkmen gas up to 2028, the amount of which is to increase gradually from 7 billion cubic metres per year in 2004 to 80 billion cubic metres per year from 2007 on – the latter date is the crucial point in the development of the country. Besides, Ashgabat has long been trying to build a gas pipeline in order to export its gas to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan and is working over the possibility of laying the gas pipeline to Ukraine and China.

What is detrimental to Turkmenistan is its isolation from external markets. The pipeline   system projected in the Soviet times was primarily northbound and because of the fact that most pipelines are situated in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, little space is allocated there for Turkmen hydrocarbons. In order to supply gas and oil westward, to the system of Azerbaijan or Russian pipelines, one needs to lay new expensive routes across the bottom of the Caspian Sea. Most countries having access to the sea won’t give their consent, and it would be more expensive to build the pipeline around the sea. Relatively free are the following vectors: the Iranian direction and the route to the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan and Pakistan. But while the realization of the Iranian project is blocked by the USA, the Afghan direction remains dependant on the situation in Afghanistan. (29)

The pivotal task for 2005 was to raise gas price to Russia and Ukraine. President Niyazov is doing his best to balance between the two and profit from their rivalry so as to increase the prices. In mid-November Turkmenistan declared the upswing of the gas price from 44 to 60 dollars per 1000 square metres, beginning from 2006. Attempting to accomplish a breakthrough in developing the gas branch and economy in general, the Turkmen government for the first time in the history of the country allowed foreign investors to export Turkmen oil and seek for buyers on their own. The measure is targeted at attracting as many investors as possible to explore and service new oil and gas fields. (30) 

Still, some analysts are sceptical about such ambitions of Niyazov, bearing in mind the uncertainty with regard to the amount of Turkmen gas deposits and production potential. In September an Asian Development Bank representative stated that the forecast with respect to the production capacity of Daulatabat gas field question the expediency of building a pipeline via Afghanistan to Pakistan. (4) July saw “Gazprom” openly express its concern as per the deposits of Turkmen gas, pointing to Ashgabat’s dragging out of conducting a promised audit. This issue is of extreme importance to “Gazprom”, which plans to increase the import of Turkmen gas up to 60-70 billion cubic metres per year by 2007, the present rate being about 45 billion. (41)

However, when “Gazprom” altered the delivery terms for its gas supplies to Ukraine, it   managed to cut short all the attempts of the latter to fully abandon the Russian gas and switch over to Turkmen fuel. “Gazprom” contracted all the capacity of Uzbek gas-transport system free from Uzbek export gas. Even if the Ukrainian government had settled the transportation issue, it would have been hardly possible that Turkmenistan would sell any gas to Ukraine, because all the free resources of the country have already been contracted by “Gazprom” for several years. (31) Thus, one can state a victory of Moscow and total dependence of Turkmenistan on “Gazprom” (i.e. on Moscow) in exporting its gas. The analysts note that “Gazprom” has ceased to exploit the fields in Russia, seeking to buy up more from its Central Asian neighbours.

In January Niyazov and Putin declared their intention to intensify the cooperation in power-producing sphere. But Turkmenistan, despite its absolute dependence on Moscow, has not been a passively subordinate party – during the last two years Niyazov has made the best use of his position to gradually double the price of the gas sold to “Gazprom”. Exploiting the “eastern vector” – China – proved to be effective policy. At the beginning of December the prime-minister’s aid Atamyrat Berdyev visited China, stating after the visit that China expressed interest in importing Turkmen gas. It is expected that in March 2006 Saparmurat Niyazov pays a rare foreign visit to China, where a contract is to be signed laying down the building of a pipeline the capacity of which would be 30 billion square metres per year. (32) Let us recall that the actual amount of Turkmen gas deposits remains a mystery.

One more peculiarity of Turkmen activity on the international arena was the policy of “positive neutrality”, which drove the country away, at times even completely isolating it from the outer world. Niyazov for the fist time voiced his ambition to make Turkmenistan a neutral country in 1995 at the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) conference, which was greeted by all its members. On December, 12 1995 the UN General Assembly adopted a special declaration, calling on UN member states to avow and respect the neutral status of Turkmenistan. (35)

In 2005 Turkmenistan stuck to its status. Thus, in spite of all the speculations about an Uzbek-Turkmen bloc, arising at the end of 2004 after the visit of Niyazov to Bukhara to meet the Uzbek president, nothing was done to further advance the relationship. Nor did the Moscow-inspired gossip about the re-deployment of the American Khanabad forces to Turkmenistan prove to be true (37). The authorities justify the reduction of Turkmen status in CIS to an associate member (the matter started to be openly debated in the Executive Committee of CIS in January 2006) as part of the neutrality conception (38).  

As it was already mentioned, tracing the connection between the foreign policy of Turkmenistan and the political situation within the country is rather problematic primarily due to the lack of information originating from the country’s isolation. One more reason is public inability to influence the policy, foreign inclusive, because of the regime harshness. In the annual Freedom House report of December, 19 Turkmenistan was rated among eight most repressive countries of the world. (40) The parliamentary elections were last held on December, 19 2004, but they turned out to be a pure formality. (33)

The information on Turkmen internal policy is generally limited to the reports on repressions. The majority of Turkmen political life analyses is much like the former “Kremlinology” and Sovietology research, as, for example, (34). Of all the Central Asian countries, Niyazov regime bears the least resemblance to a modern state. From 1985 Niyazov held the post of the Head of the Council of Ministers and headed the Communist party of Turkmen SSR, later he was the head of the Supreme Soviet, and in 1990 Niyazov was elected the first president of Turkmenistan. 

On January, 1 a new Constitution of the country entered into force, several provisions of which can be regarded as more liberal and democratic (in particular, the abrogation of the right of the president to appoint the heads of local executive authorities etc.). (41) Niyazov has lately once again started to proclaim his desire to hold elections and refer to some attributes of political life (such as political parties).

On January, 9 2006 the Turkmen television, covering the first sitting of the government in 2006, cited president Niyazov, speaking about the elections to the local councils, scheduled for this year, to ameliorate the “true democracy” mechanism. (39) On January, 12 2006, while at the ceremony of Remembrance Day, the Turkmen president declared that the presidential elections will be held in 2009-2010. At the same time he noted that “one person can not be a leader forever”, thus postulating his leaving the office. (38)

Uzbekistan

After September, 11 2001 Uzbekistan positioned itself as a strategic partner of the USA in the global war with terrorism, being the first country of the region to allow the Americans to set up an air-force base in Karshi-Khanabad (24). The partnership was not free from certain difficulties, for the Uzbek leader was obviously willing to receive full-right international recognition without introducing changes to his internal policy or facing any criticism.

Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian country to noticeably change its geopolitical orientation in 2005. The turn actually has its roots in 2002, when Tashkent practically freezed its membership in the anti-Russian and pro-Western GUUAM bloc (it will finally secede from it in only in May of 2005) (28). The reasons driving Tashkent away from the West – primarily from the USA – to approach Russia were related to the aggravating internal unrest. With regard to colour revolutions of 2003-2005, Karimov curtailed his cooperation with the West, being convinced that the revolutions arouse as the result of instigation and external intervention.

Alarmed by the perspective of a May revolution, the president ordered his troops to open fire at Andijon demonstrators, passing it as fighting Islamites. According to official statistics, 178 people were massacred, but the human rights groups and the eyewitnesses to the events speak about at least 500 dead (25). The West appealed for an international investigation into the actions of the state military forces, but Karimov rejected the proposal and shifted the blame over religious extremists, while the state-controlled media presented Andijon events as an attempt to overthrow the existing regime, which was instigated from abroad.  

On June, 29 Uzbekistan demanded that the American Karshi-Khanabad air base be closed within 180 days. This occurred right on the eve of State Secretary aid’s R. Nicholas Burns’ visit to Uzbekistan, who was up to coerce Tashkent to conduct an international investigation into Andijon events and warn that lest the country gets more open politically, it faces a threat of a colour revolution. (25) 

The expulsion of the US troops from Khanabad was an explicit demonstration of Karimov’s intentions. In response to it, the USA deprived Uzbekistan of the economic aid totalling to 22 million dollars, which was assigned for the country in 2005 provided it meets the commitments to implement political and economic reforms, outlined in the agreement on the strategic partnership between the USA and Uzbekistan of 2002. The measure was not a novelty, for last year Washington refused almost 11 million dollars to Tashkent because of Karimov’s authoritarian leaning. (25)

Simultaneously Uzbekistan moved towards Russia and China – the countries, unconditionally accepting the official version of Andijon events. Closely after the massacre of May, 25-27 Karimov visited China to sign a treaty on establishing a joint oil company worthy of 600 million dollars. (26) In September 2005 the Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov visited Uzbekistan to oversee the first joint Russia-Uzbekistan manoeuvres.

On November, 14 2005 Karimov and Putin signed an unprecedented Treaty of Alliance Relations, the third and the fourth articles of which practically permit Russian interference to the affairs of Uzbekistan in case of any internal conflict. (16) According to “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, “The signing of Russia-Uzbekistan Treaty of Alliance Relations drastically changes the disposition in Central Asia, for Uzbekistan has become a major Russian ally, not only in Central Asia, but in the whole expanse of CIS” (43). Let us note that previously the principal ally of Moscow in the region of Central Asia was Kazakhstan, that’s why the signing of the Treaty marked the Russian priority change in the region. Shortly thereafter, on November, 21 2005 the withdrawal of the American troops from Khanabad base was complete (42), which was interpreted in Moscow as a great victory.

The plans of “Gasprom” and “Lukoil” to invest around 2 billion dollars in the power sector of Uzbekistan (over a long period of time) add to the strengthening of Russia-Uzbekistan relationship. “Gasprom”, for example, initiates cooperation on the basis of an agreement to share products, which cedes to the Russian company the exploitation of the three biggest Uzbek gas fields. The implementation of the agreement would practically mean “Gasprom’s” monopolising the export of Uzbek gas. The close Russia-Uzbekistan cooperation in the gas sphere was supplemented with the accedence of Uzbekistan on January, 25 2006 to the EURASEC (EvrAzES – Euroasian Economic Commonwealth) Foundation Treaty.  

Mikhail Zygar deems that “EURASEC is just a touchstone. The real aim pursued by Moscow is the quickest possible joining of Uzbekistan the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), viewed by the Kremlin as a future military-political bloc of NATO type”. (27) It is clear that Karimov’s joining “pro-Russian NATO” is not some ideological conviction, but opportunism and the desire to retain his power, for as early as several years ago he tried to position himself as the leader of GUUAM, considered to be the alternative to the Russian influence in the post-Soviet area. 

Conclusions

The general geopolitical tendencies in Central Asia in 2005 are reflected in the evolution of SCO, comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as full-right members and India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers (Belarus is also looking for an observer status). In 2005 SCO stepped up its activities, which proves the emergence of a potentially powerful regional group of states, pursuing the interests of its mightiest members – China and Russia.

The summit of SCO leaders taking place in Kazakhstan at the beginning of June proved to be a major milestone. Its participants stated: “As the active military phase in the anti-terror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion, the SCO would like the coalition's members to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents' presence in those countries” (excerpt from SOC Astana Summit Declaration).

Soon Uzbekistan went far beyond the framework of the declaration and demanded immediate liquidation of the American base situated in its territory. The step corresponded with the Uzbek president Karimov’s apprehension concerning the fact that the West and the USA in particular, promotes destabilisation for the region and undermines his regime. Kyrgyz government merely resolved to strike better terms for the deployment of the American base and did not assign any specific time constraints for its removal.

The governments of SCO countries, those of Russia and China above all, share common conviction that the acting regimes of the region know how to govern their countries better than anyone else does, and thus they have no need for any democratic reforms. The governments of the majority of the countries in the region, China and Russia have a common propensity for exercising “directed democracy”. This contrasts with the declared aim of the West to secure the transition of post-Soviet countries not only to the market economy, but also to the democracy and guaranteed abidance by human rights.

Aleksei Malashenko of Carnegie Foundation notes that inside SCO “exist some collisions. China requests special rights to dominate SCO. And Russia is forced to accept it. It is all but easy for Russia to find its place in SCO, all the more to consent to the role of a junior, or, better to say, a middle brother under the seniority of China. When in October 2005 Beijing proposed to allocate 900 million dollars for the preferential crediting of Central Asian SCO members, Russia could not welcome such generosity, taking it as an attempt of China to gain additional weight in the organisation. Moscow disputed the Chinese proposal to introduce free trade regime in Central Asia (in that case the last barriers for the Chinese goods would disappear). The Chinese expansion, not yet started really, will advance as long as the volcano of the Chinese economic reform roars. Next to such a monolithic ethnocultural nation anyone would feel inferior. This is now characteristic of Russia.” (16)

The year of 2005 has at the same time shown the inadequacy of regarding Central Asia as a single geopolitical unit. Regional integration initiatives were no more dynamic than in the previous years, though every country had a route of its own. The purely Central Asian integration is practically non existent. Viable are only the supraregional organisations – SCO, EURASEC and CSTO – due to the presence of an external, non-Central Asian power. The integration in the Central Asian region goes so far under external pressure. Is this integration the beginning of entering into the new “Chinese world” with its “directed democracy” standards?

However, Central Asia is not the region of client-states. The local ruling elites are capable of benefiting from allowing for the wants of external powers, though not propelled by the interests of these powers, but rather by the aim to retain the power. As it is evident from the examples of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, their leaders signed SCO declaration on the necessity to retain status-quo and remove American bases, and after that started making decisions on their own. Tashkent, perceiving the threat, alienated itself from the West, while Bishkek hesitatingly proceeded with its multivector policy. In Uzbek case, Tashkent’s switch from Washington to Moscow does not signify that Russia has restored its influence in the country. The affair is merely profitably for Karimov with regard to domestic reasons. The same goes for all the ruling elites of the region.

These elites share certain visions of politics that are rather dissimilar to democracy. Indeed, they are close to the Chinese and Russian models. Russia is able to successfully “reconquest” Central Asia from Americans, since regional elites, moulded at the time of the Soviet Union, consider Russia’s might to be the pledge of their power inviolability and see the concurrence of their position with that of the Russia’s administration.

Central Asia has transformed and modernised taking into the consideration the interests of Moscow. That’s why current economic, political and social bodies and relationship remain to a certain extent slanted in favour of Moscow (for instance the pipeline system). Moscow has a better competence and experience in managing Central Asian affairs, than the neighbouring countries (like China) do, for they had had no access to Soviet Central Asia for decades. Besides, common Soviet legacy and human remembrance are acting in Moscow’s favour, enabling it to “come back” to the former colonies. That is what China lacks. But SCO provides Beijing a mechanism to enhance and legitimise its influence in the region.

SCO is propped by two pillars – Moscow and Beijing, as well as by common interests. Russia is willing to restore its position in the former colonies, China wishes to expand its influence in the region, both Russia and China need to push the USA and the West away from the region (afraid of its influence on their own people), the regimes of Central Asia plainly want to stand. The system will undergo changes – China will gain strength, Russia will soon abandon the region. In the long run, China can transform Central Asia into a part of the “Chinese world”. However, all the schemes can be upturned by democratisation, Islamism or the collapse of the Chinese model. So far we see an evolving union of directed democracies, or, broadly speaking, the regimes favouring the Chinese model. The latter is no less probable to constitute the future of a large part of the world, than the liberal democratic model, proposed by the USA. Thus, we have to be in earnest about the Central Asian geopolitical transformations in 2005.

Notes

(1)    Rashid Ahmed. The New Great Game – The Battle for Central Asia’s Oil // Far Eastern Economic Review. 1997. -- 10 April. From Rashid Ahmed. Taleban: zanan, tejarat-e mafya wa proje-ye a’azim-e naft dar asya-ye markazi. Tehran: Nashr-e boghe, 1382. p. 296. (in Persian)

(2)    http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-04-29/5_tadjikistan.html (in Tajik)

(3)    http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/tajikistan/story/2006/01/060118_so_iskandarov_appeal_cyr.shtml (in Tajik)

(4)    RFE/RL Central Asia Report// Vol. 5, No. 49, 30 December 2005.

(5)    Охрана таджикско-афганской границы перешла к военнослужащим Комитета по охране государственной границы Таджикистана (http://www.svoboda.org/ll/polit/0605/ll.061405-7.asp)

(6)    Всемирный банк намерен списать внешний долг Таджикистана (http://www.tajikistan.tajnet.com/index.cgi?id=2862)

(7)    Кэтрин Дэвис. Рахмонов сможет править до 2020 года (http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_3012000/3012084.stm)

(8)    Амина Замон. Выборы в Таджикистане (http://www.ca-oasis.info/oasis/?jrn=1&id=5)

(9)    РУСАЛ решит проблему долгов Таджикского алюминзавода? (http://www.avesta.tj/articles/14/12650.html)

(10)Алексей Балиев, Евгений Арсюхин. Алюминий, хлопок и партизаны  (http://www.rg.ru/2004/10/23/investitsii.html)

(11)Виктория Панфилова. Таджикистан может встать на ноги (http://www.ng.ru/courier/2005-09-26/12_tadjikistan.html)

(12)Госдеп США: Выборы в Казахстане прошли с нарушениями (http://www.bureau.kz/articles/obzor061205.shtml)

(13)ОБСЕ критикует выборы в Казахстане (http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_4499000/4499142.stm)

(14)США приветствуют решение властей Казахстана в отношении узбекского беженца Шамситдинова (http://www.ca-oasis.info/news/?c=1&id=6703)

(15)"Ильхам Алиев уязвлен критикой Вашингтона и пойдет на сближение с Россией": Азербайджан за неделю (http://www.regnum.ru/news/228846.html)

(16)Алексей Малашенко Центральная Азия: никто не хотел побеждать (http://www.ng.ru/courier/2006-01-16/9_china.html)

(17)Амиржан Хасенов. Марк Маккэфферти из WOOD MACKENZIE: “Сейчас Казахстан представляет для китайцев огромную стратегическую важность” (http://www.kazlink.com/cgi-bin/show.cgi?what=iframe&login=rtyomka&format=100x100&id=2985894617158920&categ=)

(18)Казахстан: будут ли "оранжевые юрты"? (http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_4487000/4487696.stm)

(19)Центрально-азиатские региональные новости. Обзор прессы за месяц (Октябрь 2005). (http://www.adb.org/Documents/Translations/Russian/carec-7CAND-Oct2005-ru.pdf)

(20)Роза Отунбаева: Кыргызстан проводит многовекторную внешнюю политику (http://www.voanews.com/russian/archive/2005-06/2005-06-15-voa2.cfm)

(21)http://www.svoboda.org/programs/tw/2005/tw.072005.asp

(22)Американская база остается в Киргизии (http://lenta.ru/news/2005/07/26/base/)

(23)В. Сокор Американское присутствие в нищем Кыргызстане- самый важный источник денежных доходов (http://www.materik.ru/index.php?section=analitics&bulid=60&bulsectionid=5076)

(24)Узбекистан потребовал вывода авиабазы США (http://grani.ru/Politics/World/m.92790.html)

(25)Robin Wright and Ann Scott Tyson. U.S. Evicted From Air Base In Uzbekistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072902038.html?sub=AR)

(26)Узбекистан и Китай: Тиран и дракон ("The Economist", Великобритания) (http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/220102.html)

(27)“Коммерсантъ”: Горючий сторонник Ислама Каримова. "Газпром" обеспечит стабильность режима в Узбекистане (http://freeuzbekistan.com/ru.php?subaction=showfull&id=1137683328&archive=&start_from=&ucat=&)

(28)Алексей Макаркін Выбор Ислама Каримова: Москва и Пекин, а не Вашингтон (http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20050705/40846118.html)

(29)Газовая отрасль: в интересах взаимовыгодного сотрудничества (http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/ekonom/ek_oil/121105.htm)

(30)Олег Лукин. Больше газа! Новый приоритет инвестиционной политики Туркменистана. (http://www.ngv.ru/projects/comments/index_.hsql?id=148)

(31)Татьяна Ивженко. Туркменбаши обманул ожидания Ющенко (http://www.ng.ru/courier/2005-10-24/11_turkmenbashi.html)

(32)Москва и Ашхабад будут крепить дружбу газом (http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/business/newsid_4640000/4640656.stm)

(33)В Туркмении прошли выборы в парламент (http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_4108000/4108649.stm)

(34)http://www.dogryyol.com/article/6261.html

(35)Murad Esenov. Turkmenistan and Central Asian Regional Security // The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 244-254 Паводле: http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/oxford.shtml

(36)Узбекско-туркменский союз может превратиться в блок (http://news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=613625012486.92,987,20867391)

(37)Владимир Иванов, Игорь Плугатарёв, Виктория Панфилова. Невероятные приключения американцев и русских в Туркестане (http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-09-06/1_adventures.html) and Central Asia: U.S. Embassy Says No Plans To Open Military Base In Turkmenistan (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/C1F548CB-6F8F-4D53-8E5B-CC91F21F82F1.html)

(38)  ЕЖЕНЕДЕЛЬНЫЙ ОБЗОР НОВОСТЕЙ О ТУРКМЕНИСТАНЕ 13 января -19 января 2006 года (http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/index.php?page=wnb/editor/wnb20060120&lang=rus)

(39) ЕЖЕНЕДЕЛЬНЫЙ ОБЗОР НОВОСТЕЙ О ТУРКМЕНИСТАНЕ 6 января - 12 января 2006 года (http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/index.php?page=wnb/editor/wnb20060113&lang=rus)

(40) ЕЖЕНЕДЕЛЬНЫЙ ОБЗОР НОВОСТЕЙ О ТУРКМЕНИСТАНЕ 16 декабря – 22 декабря 2005 года (http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/index.php?page=wnb/editor/wnb20051223&lang=rus) і www.freedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/122005.htm

(41) ЕЖЕНЕДЕЛЬНЫЙ ОБЗОР НОВОСТЕЙ О ТУРКМЕНИСТАНЕ 11 ноября - 17 ноября 2005 года (http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/index.php?page=wnb/editor/wnb20051118&lang=rus)

(42) msnbc: U.S. completes withdrawal from Uzbekistan (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10140074/)

(43) Виктория Панфилова, Владимир Киселев, Игорь Плугатарёв. Каримов обошел всех президентов СНГ (http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-11-15/5_karimov.html)

(44) Россия инвестирует в территорию вокруг киргизской авиабазы Кант (http://www.centrasia.org/newsA.php4?st=1127287860)

(45) К.Бакиев: "Мы пересматриваем соглашение о размещении американской военной базы" (http://www.centrasia.org/newsA.php4?st=1127331780)

(46) Феликс Кулов: «На зоне я помудрел, научился терпению и пониманию ситуации» (http://news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=6937194680958.4,200,20745435)

(47) Борис Талов. Ушла на базу (http://www.rg.ru/Anons/arc_2003/0923/2.shtm)

(48) Султан Жумагулов "Соколиный" скандал в Киргизии (http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_3992000/3992721.stm)