Whilst losing Northern Caucasia once and for all after the withdrawal of its armed forces and successful Armenian-Georgian negotiations, Moscow’s influence is getting weaker in the northern part of the Caucasus as well. Mass protests, clashes and arrests of guerrillas  became but a mere reality in all the northern Caucasian republics except for Osetia, a follower of Moscow’s policy.

Prehistory

After the dismantling of the USSR Moscow made a shot to use the rise in northern Caucasian national movements stirring up smaller northern Caucasian nations against newly independent Georgia and Azerbaijan. Enjoying the success in the confederates’ struggle with Tbilisi for Abkhazia at that time the Kremlin engaged itself in the development of newly created Confederation of mountain folks of the Caucasus, 1991, (which included numerous Circassian-Adygeian and Daghestan nations, Chechens and even Asetians). But Moscow’s relations with mountain-dwellers came to an end in September, 1992, when Russian government noticed equivocal intentions for independence in the Confederates, and their relations with Chechen government and suspicious bonds and the past of numerous confederates.

The majority of the confederates settled down and would live peacefully with actual authorities (e.g. their president Musa Shanibov). The minority kept on struggling in Chechen movement (e.g. Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Shamil Basayev). Nevertheless until the incursion into Chechenia in December, 1994, Northern Caucasia experienced certain lull, inner development of national identity and political movements. First war, 1994-1996, victorious for Chechens, gave a powerful impulse to anti-Russian moods in the Caucasus.

Thus the end of the 1990’s is marked by the advent of the first threatening messengers which heralded the end of Russian domination over the Caucasus. War of 1999 in Dadhestan was its peak. Shamil Basayev, one of former confederation commanders started military actions against Daghestan regime which supported Russia. In response the Russian government used tough military power and repressed major resistance centres – Islamite jamaats in Daghestan and half-independent Chechenia.  At first Putin seemed to be winning, but today it is obvious that the repressed groups have simply regenerated, the war is still going on in Chechenia, and jamaats appeared all over the Caucasus. In summer, 2005, one of the most influencial Russian backstage politicians, deputy chief of Putin’s administration, Vladislav Surkov compared the problem in Northern Caucasia with “underground fire”.

Moscow retreats: Chechenia, Daghestan, Adygeia…

The situation in Daghestan is now the most complicated one after Chechenia and Ingushetia for Russia. Although political assassinations are not a novelty there, their quantity has grown up sharply during the last 18 months – 40 in 2003, 40 in the first half of 2004 and 80 in the first half of this year. Of course some of these murders have criminal background, but still more than 30 militiamen, mainly officers from the Departmnt for combatting religious extremism, were murdered this year. The official powers make regular reports about arrests of “extremists” and weapon finds in Karachai-Circassia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Sometimes news about clashes with Islamites arrives from there.

The conclusions of the “secret” report on the Caucasian situation delivered by the Russian president’s representative in Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak testify to weakness of the official powers. The main idea implied is the defeat of Moscow’s policy in the Caucasus. “Overwhelming of unsolved social, economic and political problems is nearing a critical level. Further neglect of these problems can provoke much more protest actions, uncontrolled developments which will eventually lead to open social, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts.”

Results of some questionings can only support the probability of this scenario. According to All-Russian center for Public Opinion Research more than a half of Daghestans would be ready to take part in authorized protest actions (this figure is 34% on average in Southern Federal District (SFD)) and not fewer than 29% – in unofficial protest actions (10% in SFD). At the same time 15% Daghestans are “ready to take extremist actions”; 8% are ready to capture buildings and block roads and 7% would use weapons. News summaries on attacks on militiamen and soldiers only confirm that these are not mere empty words.

An increase in rebel, partisan and criminal activity forces the Kremlin to take measures. President Putin has already told about the deployment of two military bases and two newly formed brigades in Daghestan and Karachai-Circassia and announced that counter-terrorist operation area is expanded over the territory of all the Caucasian republics.

However the Kremlin has to step back sometimes before more peaceful forms of resistance the Caucasian peoples put up. Thus Moscow had to give up their plans to join Adygeia to Krasnodar Territory and abolish national autonomy thereby. Despite the predominance of Russians in Adygeia (they constitute 70% of the population) Circassians-Adygeians rose up against integrational intentions with the government backing them up. Mass protest actions held by Adygeians, tough resistance to Moscow’s projects put up by autonomy’s authorities and open solidarity from related Circassian-Adygeian peoples forced Moscow to withdraw although Putin had managed to eliminate three national autonomies in northern areas of the Russian Federation.

Was it poverty that provoked Caucasian mutiny?

Russian experts are inclined to explain the rising instability by low living standards, unemployment, venality of the local elites and growing disillusionment in official institutions. However the problem of poverty is not as one-sided as it seems at first glance. It would not be groundless to say that the land lives thanks to a parallel financial system.

The point is that although Daghestan is noted for the lowest nominal wage (2 973,7 roubles), currency exchange operations rate is the highest in among the Russian regions. During the last two years the local population’s expenditure on foreign currency increased from 1,6 to 8,8 billion roubles. According to official information the rests of deposits have increased 2,7 times during the last 4 years in Northern Caucasian Savings Bank of Russia, and in Daghestan department they’ve risen 17,5 times! Indignant at the size of shadow economy Putin’s plenipotentiary in Southern Federal District Kozak even suggested limiting financial authorities in the regions where shadow economy constitutes more that 60%.

In fact another economy uncontrolled by the official authorities functions in the republic. As far as official economy is concerned it only arouses disillusionment and questions. The point is that formally the budget of potentially rebellious regions of the Caucasus greatly depends on State subsidies (84% of Daghestan budget comes from the Federal centre). During the last four years Federal subsidies increased 3,5 times with the expectation of one Caucasian inhabitant, although population’s income is still 1,5 times lower than average income in Russia.

But the subsidies are too low to hope for any kind of systematic influence. For example, 5,8 mln roubles will be appropriated for development of Chechenia, twice as little as for the arrangements for the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of Kazan. Let us recall that renovation sometimes happens only on paper, since several departments are in charge of renovation and no one personally bears responsibility for that. As the result the ruling clans gradually misappropriate cash assets which do not even reach their destination – local population. The Kremlin actually bribes local barons’ loyalty.

The population itself lives thanks to another economic system. Thus the basis for economic independence is being laid. Therefore not only such effective (efficacious?) aspects as  rebellious and guerilla movement or lack of support for the local authorities but also some economic processes confront Russia in the Caucasus. These processes are getting less attractive to the mass media, yet they are more significant for Russia’s future especially in the long term. Shadow economy corrodes any state, but when this economy is mostly governed by nationalists and when it turns into a “basis” for an ideologic “superstructure” (according to Marx) of a national minority aspiring to separation from this state, then shadow economy becomes a component of independence movement and along with political and cultural elements it can easily eliminate century-old reign of “aliens” on its way; the “aliens” are a nation supporting the central government.

There are some other things that caused anti-Russian resistance. Firstly, national (and inevitably religious) renascence took place from the beginning of 1990’s in the Caucasus. When in 1983 there were only 27 mosques in Daghestan, now their number is 1595, besides 422 educational religious institutions function in this country. The absence of tough governmental control and a possibility of international contacts (with the Islamic world mostly) gave rise to considerable masses of people able to fancy their life outside the Empire. A lot of them are Islamites, of course; but in the Eastern countries Islamites somewhat resemble Belarusan nationalists, i.e. they are united power able to confront tyranny and offer a worthy alternative. The problem is that in Western countries they sometimes do not understand the progressive role of neither our nationalism nor Eastern Islamism.

Along with the advent of new intellectually developed personnel for anti-Putin political movement, the structure of the Caucasian population was gradually undergoing certain changes. Multitudes of Circassian repatriates, exiled at the time of Circassian genocide, returned home to Eastern Caucasia. The local Russian population gradually died out and left the land; and now Russians are considerably less numerous than they used to be. Thus, Russian population in Daghestan has decreased by a half during the last fifteen years, and now there are only 4,7% (120 000) Russians according to the latest census. Only during the last four years 20 thousand Russians have left the country. This process is caused by unemployment, hostility of local population and crime situation.

Not only Russians but also 700 thousand of natives were leaving the land. However firstly they do not forget their homeland and do not lose their ties with relatives (the amount of money orders is an evidence of that) and secondly Daghestan population is not in danger of extinction thanks to their population upsurge tempos.

Although Russian population has decreased by 400 000 during the firs half of this year, Northern Caucasus is experiencing population growth. Now a Daghestan woman has on average 1,8 children, whilst in Russia this figure is 1,3. Life expectancy in Daghestan is 68 years and 58 in Russia. Native peoples of Northern Caucasia have increased considerably during the last two decades and this is typical also of fairly small nations. Thus, according to the last Soviet census Circassian population counted 50,8 thousand people, and the latest Russian census has the number of 61 thousand; Chechenians increased from 957 thousand to 1 361 thousand; Tabasaranians – from 93,6 thousand to 132 thousand, etc. This certainly instills more confidence in the Caucasian peoples as for their future.

Certain optimism can be explained by yet irresolute but still self-dependent development of Southern Caucasia getting rid of Russian influence. Pipeline from Baku to Jeykhan has buried Russian hope for a return to Azerbaijan. The Daghestans in their turn have witnessed a new independent state, which used to share bondage with them. So anti-Russian uprise in the Caucasus should not be ascribed to economic determinism, since some other things contributed to that. As far as economy is concerned we should take a better look at it, for life is not easy not only in Northern Caucasus but also in the Northern part, home to national minorities, however interestingly enough the Caucasus is more rebellious (нешта тут з поўначу ды Каўказам незразумела. Hard life can also be different.

Away from Moscow to Islamism

Agains the background of inefficient Russian government, its Caucasian institutions seem a purely venal mechanism which processes Federal subsidies. The Regional and Federal authorities are nearly illegitimate, and the situation is even worsened by the impossibility to change officials of high ranks in all the Caucasian regions, because any step will provoke a struggle for repartition of spheres of influence and control.

Take Daghestan’s governor Magomedali Magomedov for example: the term of his power will expire next summer, and the substitution of State Council Chairman is inevitable, which will bring the intricate scheme of inter-ethnic and inter-clan relations of political and economic system to crisis. The existing system where some positions are occupied by people of only one nationality helped the land overcome the crises of the last 15 years. That wasn’t easy though. However the approaching elections will inevitably lead to destabilization, with Magomedov’s clan intact or with the advent of another clan.

This seemingly ethnic, but in reality clannish reign has no future, and today’s system cannot secure stable and long time development. In order to secure its dominion Moscow politicians have to establish a new bureaucratic government system based on efficiency, but not on clan reign. Such an underground state, having no regard to clans and nations is proposed by Islamites. They are embodying this kind of state in jamaats. Islamites are leading so far. It means that the situation of the middle of the 19th century is repeating when imam Shamil united Daghestan and Chechenia under religious slogans, breaking down the resistance of venal princes who supported Moscow.

Today the Kremlin is about to introduce external Moscow government into Northern Caucasian regions and try to set up an effective bureaucratic system. However with the local clans struggling for power it is dangerous to assign Regional governors directly for it may entail even worse destabilization. If an official assigned by the Kremlin does not have a reliable local team of his own then it looks like he has no actual bonds and power instruments. Only independent leaders, not favoured by Moscow, can govern efficiently. He who is governed but cannot govern himself can only aggravate the situation. Ingushetia is a striking example. Its leader – self-dependent Aushev – was superceded by a KGB member Ziazikov, a politician obedient to Moscow and possessing no clan bonds and venal instruments. And now the republic is living in fear of terrist acts, which became a usual phenomenon.

Three political forces are interested in keeping the Caucasian crisis unsolved. The first one is the actual republican power, who is going to secure its domain for an uncertain term. The second one is the internal opposition seeing each conflict as a chance to discredit the regime. The third one is the new Chechenian elites guided by Russia who would have this contrast of relative peace (acieved by means of “Kadyrov’s stabilization”) with Daghestan, rolling down into chaos.

It is known that collaborationalist Chechenian elites are in contact with certain influencial groups in Moscow, including Federal coercive institutions trying to manipulate the Caucasian situation in their interests. It’s not hard to abuse Caucasian troubles, especially when the majority of Russian citizens consider the Caucasian conflict as a chronic weakness somewhere far away. According to a survey conducted by Public Opinion Fund, 54% of the respondents consider the Caucasian conflict unchanged, 57% doubted a successful conflict resolution.

Chechenia has already proved that it could be “pacified” by means of all the battle-worthy Russian military forces. So creating other “controlled conflicts” in the Caucasus would be fatal to Russia, especially that there are no strategic reserves.

Birth of new state formations

Ivan Sukhov, a reviewer of “Vremya novostei”, has noted that impetuous secret separation from Russia is taking place in the Caucasian republics. This is happening along with economic depression and total crisis in population’s support of their governments. Today the local population is only seemingly loyal to the official authorities. But in fact strong alienation from the Federal authorities and the rest of the country is increasing. Parallel social political and legal area is being formed in the Caucasus. And this area is only formally under Moscow’s jurisdiction.

The administrative border separating Daghestan, Chechenia, Ingushetia from Stavropol Territory and Asetia is guarded as a state border not without purpose. And any trip northward from these republics is called “a trip to Russia” in local languages. In such a way a “grey zone” (under relative control from the Kremlin) is quickly being formed along Russian southern border. And although not a single person from the regional elites says aloud about the necessity to urgently separate from Russia, their loyalty is only relative, like their control over the population.

Parallel state structures in the form of jamaats based on religious principles are developing rapidly in the region. These masses of believers are not necessarily inclined to terrorist methods or radical fundamentalism, but they create a special social area where Russian social and legal norms are not valid. If a government is unable to secure supremacy of their own laws on their own territory then such a state cannot be sovereign. And this is an expressive symptom of an inevitable loss of control over a territory.

Despite the differences in their goals, Islamic jamaats, local venal clans and organized crime are doing the same job – they are turning into a state, in somewhat an unusual form though. The parallel state structure is filling the vacuum, charges itself with functions which used to belong to Russian authorities. It cultivates its codes of honour hostile not only to the official government but to Russian mentality as well.

Restless Islam

Taking the closed nature of the local elites and the absence of social mobility into consideration, jamaats posses immense resources for their development being bearers of parallel underground authority. Once in the beginning of the 1990’s Russian authorities viewed Islam as a force capable of uniting Daghestan nations. However Islam did not become a prerequisite for stability, however the government gave out a lot of money for mosques. All the basic divergences between the followers of the “real” traditional Sufi Islam (typical of Daghestan) and ever increasing so called “vakhabites” (a.k.a salafists).

As experts note, this is not the case of special piety, aspirations to the purity of the faith or disillusionment with traditional Islam, but this is rather the case of injustice of the social system. As Russian orientalist D.Makarov thinks, “vakhabism and Sufi Islam have different attitudes towards Daghestan social and political system based on traditional relations within a clan. Sufi Islam is a substructure of these bonds. When vakhabism rejects Sufism it rejects the system Sufism approves of”. The criticism of venal authorities was made basis for propaganda and agitation by Daghestan vakhabites. Vakhabism is more rationalistic than mystic Sufism; therefore their criticism of the authorities is not insane, but it is rather a manifestation of a rational approach.

Mass power abuse by some officials, seclusion of the authorities and their indifference towards the problems of the population became main reasons for jamaats’ mutiny. The vakhabites make use of an effective alternative to the present situation; they have in fact offered a new universalist project. This is justice model of an Islamite society, where there is no room for clans, tribes and cliques, i.e. ethnic superiority. Therefore salafism can gain popularity in multinational and fragmented Daghestan.

All of them: salafis, vakhabits and Sufis - are opposed by Russian authorities. Local militiamen are actually perceived as a gang by the population of each republic. That’s why Daghestan Islamites’ attacks on the militia are widely supported. Local governmental bodies are divided between individual clans. However Federal bodies in the form of the President’s plenipotentiary in Rostov are noted for their capability to arouse new conflicts and waste population’s support, e.g. declaring their plans to unite  the regions.

***

It is of importance for Moscow to secure stability in Northern Caucasus, mainly in Daghestan, and with regard to realization of new economic projects on the Caspian Sea (creation of new transport corridors, modernization of ports, building pipelines, modernizing petroleum production and gas-extraction). The Caspian military fleet, located in Daghestan, is a significant instrument of Moscow’s military and political influence. Daghestan coast and its infrastructure is a serious resource of Russian influence on central Asian countries. That’s why losing Daghestan Russia will withdraw not only from the Caucasus but also from Central Asia.

Consolidation of independence tendencies (of nationalistic and Islamite kind) in the Caucasus will foster the growth of such tendencies among other peoples of Russia, mainly Bashkortostan and Tatarstan (by the way some similar phenomena and processes are already taking place there). It is worth while warning against seeing these tendencies in the context of antiterrorist fight, since it distorts the reality and narrows the consideration of the tendencies to ideologic drills in order to justify the reality (not always justified and almost always unjust).

Islam is an inseparable component of national identity of the majority of the Caucasian nations. So it’s only natural that any liberation movement will turn to religious motifs in their activity. However characterizing today’s instability in the Caucasus as a fight of a civilized state versus barbarians-Islamites financially supported by foreign states, is just the same as considering the activity of Polish “Solidarność” as a riot of ignorant insane Catholics “bribed by CIA dollars” against temporal power.

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[1] http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,361236,00.html

[2]http://www.radiomayak.ru/schedules/6852/22752.html

http://www.radiomayak.ru/schedules/17/23032.html i

http://www.radiomayak.ru/05/07/11/194/

[3] Mikhail Zygar. The extreme defeat // Kommersant. 2005. № 163.

[4] The results are available on the Institute’s web-page: http://www.wciom.ru/

[5] Mansur Chuaduko. Siarhiej Bohdan. The Circassians are defending against Moscow // Naša Niva. 2005. № 18.

[6] http://www.radiomayak.ru/interview/05/07/08/37780.html

[7] After: A. Malashenko. Muslim guiding lines in Northern Caucasus. – М., 2001., and A.Poliakov. The influence of the external factor on radicalization of Islam in Russia in the 1990’s. // Islam on the post-Soviet area: A look from inside. – М., 2001.

[8] The results of Russian census of 2002 are available at http://www.infostat.ru/katalog/vpn/.

[9] For further details see http://www.fom.ru

[10] http://www.ipma.ru/publikazii/etnosotn/729.html

[11] http://www.inosmi.ru/stories/01/10/05/3026/139580.html

[12]http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/press/newsid_4203000/4203372.stm

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Siarhiej Bohdan (born in 1982 in Maładečna) graduated from BSU, International Relations Department, faculty of International Relations. Studies Islamic theology. Range of political interests – Islamic and national liberation movements of  the Middle East, the Caucases and  Asia. A long-standing contributor to "Arche" and "Naša  Niva", translator from English, German and Persian.