"… and I had a dream of a giant grasping a child by his legs in order to  

        smash him against the rock.

- Stop! Think about what you are doing, - I couldn’t help shouting to the man.

- What is that I'm doing? Just want to smash the bastard against the rock.

- But he is a human being! – I was clamouring.

- So what? Let him be a human being – and I’ll kill the human being.

- But one has no right to kill human beings!

- The giant, holding the helpless stretched child by his ankle, glanced at me and smiled mockingly.

- No right? Why don’t I have a right to kill him?

- Because … he has got dignity, he’s a personality!

- Are you some kind of philosopher? What do I care for someone’s dignity? I’ll smash him and there will be no dignity.

- He … - I was nearly choking, feverishly searching for some other arguments to win the beast over. – The child is innocent. He has done no harm to you…

- Ha! Innocent! If I don’t kill him now, he’ll grow up and might want to kill me.

- But try to recollect your own childhood, the time when you yourself were small and defenceless… Think about what you would have felt if someone had tried to kill you?

- They were free to kill me. Had I been dead, what difference would it have been to me if they had been killing me?

- He is a God’s creation! – I was bawling.

- The man thundered with laughter:

- Are you some priest or a monk? You’re a fool. Go pontificate somewhere else …

I will kill the child anyway.

This very second, lying in cold sweat and trepidation, I woke up…"

Professor Jacek Filek recounted this "dream" at his ethics lecture for Jagiellonian University. It was meant to illustrate the fact, that rational argumentation may not always be effective in ethical and moral issues (as well as in the realm of legislature) … Ethics, morals and law are the spheres of life where substantial importance is reserved for will and decisions rather, than for reason and argumentation.

Nevertheless, ethics, morals and law do not exist in a theoretical vacuum. Human beings are prone to ground their conduct and point out the reasons, causes or principles of certain actions. (A brilliant illustration to the propensity is the rite of those drinking together: for they ostensibly attach great importance to the question "what are we drinking to?" because "one cannot just drink"!) Some actions are interpretable in the frame of custom, culture, values, religion etc. Still a conundrum arises: how can we ground the basic principles? Are they embedded into our human essence? Given by God? Or are they just a spontaneous consensus, an unwritten arrangement, a convention? It is here exactly, that a knot of misunderstanding ties itself, which affects social-political and legal cultures. A great number of problems hinge on the old as the hills dilemma "nature" or "convention", or in the wording of the ancient Greeks: "fusis" or "nomos"?

Our objective is a seemingly easy one – we shall analyse the "natural right" concept and ascertain its importance (or insignificance) to the theory of law. But while analyzing we'll get to know, that our intention was not just ambitious, but in a sense a risky one, for the very concept of "the basis of morals and law" will appear to be quiet problematic and dubious.

1. The analysis of the "natural right" (lex naturae)

           1.1 "Nature versus culture"

The Latin word "nature" derives from the verb "nasci" – to be born. "Natura" is a verbal in the future tense. Its primary meaning is something that is to be born. But in the course of history it has lost its future reference and is now referred to the past: something born, a totality of natural features, plainly nature. As mentioned before, the opposite of the Greek "fusis" (nature) was the word "nomos" (law), though in some contexts "fusis-techne" was the correct opposition. Thus, the opposite of "nature" could be techne – craftsmanship, ability to make something new, production. In some cases "poesis" (the origin to "poetry") – human creation - was also the opposite of the "nature".

Following the etymology, we'll ascertain the meaning of the expression "human nature". The human nature is a totality of characteristics, inherent in a human being, regardless of his will. What class of contrast can that be: what can we set off against the nature understood in such a way? There is no doubt that the contrast class is made up by the original (primary) meaning of the word "culture", i.e. something that is to be "processed", remade or refined. Taking this into consideration, let us peruse the following table.

Natura (nature, fusis)	Cultura (event)
something primordial (primitive);	the outcome of conscious action
unconscious, uncontrollable body	soul
matter	spirit
brain	mind
Neurophysiological impulses, instincts	will
determinism	indeterminism
inevitability (inner compulsion)	Freedom (a range of possibilities)
non-differential status	differentiation
potentiality, opportunity	Opportunity actualization

The table is in no way a "metaphysical project", it was created out of purely heuristical motives.

Where should we localize the "natural law" – at the left or right? Or some "third column" is required for it? If so, what kind of column should it be, to which category were it to belong? In order to find the answer (at least get close to it) one needs to take up the classicists that created the theoretical basis to the natural law concept. 

           1.2  St. Thomas Aquinas – the classical scholar of natural law

In fact, here we will trace the ideas of one single classic, not all of them. The one will be St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who shaped the classical variant of the natural law theory.

So far, I wittingly leave aside all the alternative variants of the natural law theory (those by Hobbs, Locke, Lorenz, Wilson). I do so because while analysing (and criticizing) Thomas' version of lex naturae, we will mediately, through the critics' voices, touch upon the competing interpretations.

The natural law [lex naturae] is nothing but the light of mind [lumen intellectus], instilled [insitum] into us by God. Thanks to it we cognize what to do and what to avoid. The light was given to us by God at the moment of creation. [i] (a)

At the same time Aquinas formulates the human nature in the categories of Aristotelian hylomorphism (hylo – matter, raw material and morphe – form), stating, that a human being is corpore et anima unus, a spiritual-corporal unity.[ii] (b) Thus, "natura" is not understood here as "nature" (in its primary meaning of the totality of physiological peculiarities), but rather as body-and-soul, the unity of the two.

The hylomorphic interpretation of the "human nature" is supplemented by Aquinas with the assertion of the natural law's universality and invariability (c).The encyclic Veritatis splendor gives the following commentary to Aquinas' view: "It is owing to the soul-and-body unity solely, that we can speak about the universal character of the natural law. Engraved into a rational human's nature, the law is valid to everyone regardless of the historical period".[iii]

Finally, we have to take into consideration the separate principles that Aquinas was supposed to take as natural law exemplification. Thus, these principles are to be characterized (better – are characterized) by universality and invariability:

1)     doing good and evading evil;

2)     the concern about reproduction and staying alive;

3)     the expansion and cultivation of the surrounding world's riches;

4)     participation in public life;

5)     the search for the truth;

6)     doing good deeds;

7)     contemplation of beauty[iv] (d).

The context gives us grounds to think that the seven principles are not supposed to be the full list of the natural law principles.

Let us analyze (a), (b), (c), (d).

         1.2.1. Analysis (a). The expression "the light of mind" ("lumen intellectus") functions in the Aquinas' definition as genus proximus and "instilled by God" (insitum a Deo) as differentia specifica. The two fundamental notions (constituting the core of the definition) are evidently metaphorical, which means they are not definite enough as concepts. "Instilled by God" can only mark the origin of the "light". The only conclusion we can make from this is that the natural law is of supranatural provenance, God is its creator and guarantor. Nevertheless the definition comprises some information of no small importance about the natural law, namely, its "patrimony" – the mind (intellectus)[v]. By using the word "instilled" Thomas refers us to the act of human creation, the initial, "archetypical" process related in Genesis.

The analysis of (a) vividly shows that the natural law doesn't belong to the left column of the table. Whether it suits the right one remains yet not clear.

         1.2.2. Analysis (b). Here we've got a serious modification in the understanding of nature, which can be illustrated by the following order of concepts: (human) nature ® the psychophysical unity ® matter-body Ù form-soul ® (human) personality. Glancing at the table now, we'll notice how different is the primal, etymological nature understanding (A) from the just rendered (B). At the same time we have to admit that the "nature" in its (B) version cannot be assigned to the right column.

Let us try to hypothetically reveal the evolution of the concept of nature in its (A) meaning. In the course of time the notion has "inflated", that can be most vividly illustrated with the saying consuetudo est altera natura – "habit is second nature". So far we see that some acquired traits, firmly imprinted into human personality and forming the texture of his behaviour, begin to be perceived through analogy to the nature, i.e. the innate and rigidly determined qualities. The "nature" grows synonymic to the character.

It was under the influence of the classical Greek philosophers' essentialism, that the concept of nature further deviated from its initial meaning. Aristotle, in particular, regarded "fusis" (nature) both as the final cause and the metaphysical principle – the essence. It resulted in inflation and syncretism of the "nature" notion. Besides the term being ambiguous (that is, in fact, seldom realized), there is one more challenge: how should we interpret this metaphysical (B) exposition? A distinct denotation is missing: is it the class of mature, intelligent people that form it? Or is the idea of an intelligent person the very sought for denotation? If so, what is the idea, who is it created and formulated by? Or is the totality of human propensities (spiritual, psychological) the denotation? What are the propensities then? The connotation is - once again – vague: what distinctive features should we ascribe to this "metaphysical" nature, where to does its class of contrast stretch?

         1.2.3. Analysis (c). In what way is the natural law invariable and universal? We can provisionally interpret it in two ways: A: (c) is the descriptive sentence; B: (c) is the normative sentence. In the first case the invariability-universality thesis can be transformed into:

A': that what we call the natural right has never been de facto changed so far. It is de facto present in all the generations and cultures;

In another case:

B': what is the natural law is to remain the same everywhere and anytime.

If we concur with the A interpretation and the A' re-formulation, a question arises: how is it possible to ascertain that the principles have not changed somewhere or sometime? The intention of carrying out any historical-ethnical research so accurate as to positively claim the invariability and the universal character of the principles would be absolutely utopian. Thus, there remains the B interpretation.

In the writings of St. Aquinas we can find a statement, that it is via the natural law, that a human soul participates (participat) in the eternal divine law. This "participation" is possible in two ways: per modum cognitionis (by intellectual cognizance) and per modum actionis et passionis (by acting and percepting). But because human cognizance as well as will and feelings (responsible for "acting and percepting") are distorted as a result of the original sin, Aquinas differentiate between three "tiers" of natural law: 1) the principles universally known and compulsory to all; 2) the principles universally compulsory but not known by all and 3) the principles neither known to all nor compulsory for any human being. We are especially interested in those of the first category.

There is one more interpretational stumbling-block here. If natural law exists in two spheres – cognitive and will-sensual – a question arises about the co-extensiveness of the natural propensities' object and the good as seen by the mind. To put it plainly, are the mind-cognizance and feelings-propensities always in accord in the realm of natural law or is it possible, that the mind advises one thing and the propensities – another one? If so, we need an additional criterion to settle which "vote" is overriding. And the criterion does exist – Thomas, one of Aristotle's progeny, puts forward "ethical intellectualism" – the prevalence of mind over the will and the feelings.

It still seems possible to find a third interpretation to add to the second one: C: (c) is the expression of one's belief, that regardless of the cultural background and the epoch people are prone to revere the natural law.

The following conclusion seems to be relevant: the (c) thesis begets two ideas. Firstly, it is the expression of the belief, that all human beings possess some moral "resource" (whether it is identical or similar remains a question), and, secondly, (c) constitutes a moral imperative for all the cultures to accept and to institutionally establish what is the natural right.

Let us consider what are these resources-propensities, which are, according to Aquinas, universal and invariable. In other words, what is the designate of the expression "natural law"?

            1.2.4. Analysis (d). All the seven examples, which form the exemplification of the natural right, pertain to the cultural sphere. These principles neither depend on neurophysiology, nor are they implemented through the instincts exclusively. It is impossible to fathom their existence without at least basic upbringing (socialization) and minimal reflection and freedom. As they belong to the sphere of culture, why do we call them the law of nature?

Everything is not as simple as it seems to be. "Culture" is the term as ambiguous as the term "nature". Providing his comment to Veritatis splendor, Doctor Maciej Zięba OP notes: A human being, as a psychophysical creature, always exists in a certain cultural and political context, but he's not a slave to any force or structure, whether biological, psychological, economic or cultural. He remains free from any determinism[vi]. Father Zięba also pointed out the ambivalence of culture: culture – on the one hand - can bring about the development (actualization) of human possibilities and the release of one's spiritual potential, but – on the other hand – it also may turn into a system of compulsion, suppressing person and favouring the deformations of conscience. The coercion can take various forms: from the "legal" pressure (grounded on the legislation of the state) to social-psychological compulsion that expresses itself through public strain and the marginalisation of those unwilling to bend to the cultural dogmas of that society. If we consider this cultural ambivalence, it would be easier for us to understand why a number of scholars are so unwilling to renounce the category of the natural right, though the price to pay for this is rather high: it is necessary to assent to the semantical blurriness of "natural law", resulted in interpretational difficulty.

Are the principles enlisted by Thomas of normative character? It seems that the answer is negative. The principles are merely the summarizing description of universal human propensities, the propensities, proper to someone, who has crossed the "threshold of reflection", has grown capable of conceiving values and acting civic. Aquinas' catalogue can be extended with:

         1') the use of articulate language for communication;

         2') the desire to love and be loved;

         3') the need for creative work etc.

Both the Thomas' "digest" (1-7), and the above-presented principles (1'-3') can be called the natural pre-normative law. They can, even should, be accepted as the background for norm-creation and are to be taken into consideration by the lawmakers, though they are not given norms.

It is of interest, that the presentation of the Thomas' natural law concept in the above cited encyclic Veritatis splendour employs the following terms to convey its essence: proclivitates (proclivities), motus (animation), propensiones (propensities), dynamismi (inner impetus), proposita (propositions). These proclivities-animations-inner impetus-propositions cannot be interpreted as norms, but just as moral "resource".

Does this signify that the natural law was for Aquinas of pre-normative value exclusively? Or is it the only possible meaning of the natural law in Thomas' interpretation? It turns out, that here we deal with equivocation once again. In questia 100 of the "Summa Theologica" moral section Thomas Aquinas states: "Leges divinae totam legem naturalem continent"[vii], that means, the natural law (NL) resides in Divine Law (DL):

NL É DL

Does NL, residing in DL, remains pre-normative or does it not?

In this case, NL is to be interpreted as a Decalogue, and a Decalogue pertains to normative law (though it is too general in its meaning). Thus, natural law acquires a normative feature. The "natural law" enjoys both the normative and the pre-normative meanings in Aquinas' system.

To sum up our analysis, let us highlight the main problem points, discovered in the course of our research:

            Firstly, what is the "human nature"? We are only aware of the fact that it is the human essence that is concerned, but, taking into account its "composite" character, we are bound to specify whether we imply physiological, intellectual or psychological processes? What is this "norm-creating" trait in a human being that is responsible for the emergence of the natural law in its normative sense? The indication of the "psycho-physiological unity" clarifies nothing. It might just adjourn the answer. We are to acknowledge that the "psycho-" is culturally stipulated. Thus, nature is in some way culturally determined, and the world is bounteous with cultures!

            All this leads us to the following: (secondly) the natural law concept bears the "theory cognizing" dilemma: how do we cognize this law? What should we do, if different people hold different views of the law? Whose is the right interpretation?

           Thirdly, how can we differentiate between the natural and pre-normative law?

There are two answers to these questions: the "destructive" and the "constructive" ones. Let us present the criticism of the natural law first of all (that will be our pars destruens), and then try to revise the conception and – partially – vindicate it (pars construens). 

2.  The departure from nature. Conventionalism.

            2.1. The Critique of the traditional natural law concept from the analytical philosophy stand.

H. Moor, the father of analytical philosophy, called the moral conceptions, based on natural law, a "naturalist fallacy". "Good is a beyond empirical and thus a simple quality"[viii]. It can neither derive from the nature of a human being, nor from the sphere of facts taken in general. The facts are axiologically neutral.

The term "nature" can be used in the following combination within a specific context: "the nature of action". One can find – especially in Thomas' ethics – the category of the "acts intrinsically wicked" (intrinsece mala). Such acts are, for example, a murder or lies, false oath etc. But – as theologian Joseph Fuks SJ, who employs analytical philosophy in his grounding, notes – as a result of such actions as murder or lying we get to know only that they result in something evil. But a moral appraisal is impossible without considering the intentions and circumstances. As another theologian, Richard A. McCornik SJ, says: If we just take a photo of the incident, we'll learn nothing about the essence of it. The example is when one person gives money to another one. This can mean, that he pays back, makes a gift, gives alms, hands a bribe etc. Until we find out the objective intentions of a person, we can not define the moral side of the act[ix]. This could be rather convincing criticism of the category "the nature of action", provided we consent to the McCornik's interpretation of acting, namely, that an action is an exclusive aggregate of outer moves and gestures.

Joseph Fuks also criticizes "the theological form of naturalist fallacy", i.e. the vision of the natural propensities of a human being as the manifestation of the normative divine will. According to this mode of thinking stoic Epictetes claimed, that beard shaving by men is morally reprehensible, for the Creator's will was such as men should differ from women by having beard. For the similar reasons early-Christian writer Tertulian forbade cosmetics: A human being is not to want any other appearance than given to him by God. 

The analytical philosophy gave us a chance to realize two major problems, that have to do with the natural law: for the natural law to acquire normative status, it has to be somehow interpreted, for the facts remain axelogically neutral. According to Fuks, the answer to the question on the moral appraisal of an act is not given by nature, but rather by mind, which weighs up all the pros and cons of various opportunities[x]. The second problem is that the natural law formula is always "subjectised", i.e. there always exists some subject (or objects), which describes and interprets nature.

"Human nature, - sums up Fuks, - is blind in the sphere of morals. The human nature speaks of the facts exclusively, while it is silent in the realm of values". 

             2.2 The Critique of the traditional natural law concept from the evolutionist and historicist stance

Cynthia Crysdale, professor at The Catholic University of America, notes that the expression the "natural law" can be interpreted in two ways. It can signify the according to nature and the according to reason. For the sake of avoiding any misinterpretation Crysdale suggests, that the meaning of term "nature" should be restricted to "the aggregate of physical, chemical, botanical and zoological manifestations of the human and non-human world"[xi].

Crysdale mentions "the transition from the classicist outlook to the historical awareness". According to the classicist mentality, the world is static, once and for all settled in its essence, where the "fortuities" are either negligible "deviations from the norm", or the fruit of our hideboundness (for "if to search well", the logical explanations of these fortuities will be found).

The above presented observations lead Crysdale to revisionism in the sphere of the natural law. Firstly, she remarks, "the manifold of nature, grounding human existence, cannot be simply translated into moral norms. (…) That is why the natural law principles are to be sooner superstructured on the human consciousness structures ("mind"), than derived from the animal flair or the biological processes ("nature")". Secondly, "as the human intelligence, so one's moral behaviour are relatively free".

             2.3. "Naturalism" versus "open society"? (The critique of the traditional natural law concept from the stance of K. Popper's liberalism)

The issue of natural law interpretation was pivotal for the "open society" theoretician Karl Popper. One of the salient conditions for the existence of the open society was the so-called critical dualism – the ability of the community members to differentiate between the "natural law" and the "conventional law". What does Popper mean by the first and the second?

The natural law, - writes Popper – describes a strict and invariable regularity, which either exists in nature (and then the law is the truthful statement), or there is no such law in the real life (in this case it is false). (…) The law of nature is invariable, for they cannot be broken or imposed. They are above our control.[xii]

K. Popper stresses that the natural law – in its (A) meaning – should not be confused with the norms, orders and instructions, which regulate human behaviour. Thus, alongside with the natural law, there exists the normative law in the meaning (B). The law of (A) type relates to that of the (B) type as the fact relates to the decision:

fact                     -           natural law

decision               -       normative law

Though Popper mentions that it is possible to use the expression the "natural law" in a normative sense, he states at once with the desire for clarity and maximum simplicity so characteristic of him: "The confusion is quite unnecessary".

The demarcation between the (A) and the (B) laws is for Popper the criterion of violation: the natural law can not ex defenitione be violated or abolished. One can only violate the conventional law. And this is the first reason, why the author of "The Open Society" postulates the consistent differentiating between the (A) and the (B). Secondly, even if some law is defined as natural (in its traditional, Aquinas' sense), a decision is needed to implement it.

The reference to the "don't kill" principle as a "natural law" would be useless if separate individuals fail to agree to respect the principle. By analogy, the adoption of the legislation aiming at human live protection does not pass "naturally" (i.e. on its own accord, without human will), but by way of certain convention, consensus and decision elaboration. The single "natural character" of the norms does not make a human being obey it.

Thirdly, the norms and the normative law can be created and established by a human being. (…) We are to ameliorate them in case of necessity – says Popper.[xiii] And fourthly, it is we who are ultimately responsible for these or those norms, that is why we can not shift the responsibility to God or to the "nature".

As we see, Popper's admonitions regarding the natural law are of methodological-ethical character.

               2.4. The natural law and the political practice

It would be relevant to present here also the critique of the natural law by modern political philosophy. Let us be guided by Ernst-Wolfgang Bökenförde.

One of the problem points outlined by Bökenförde is the seeming "pre-political character" of the natural law. He mentions that the German bishops backed Hitler's party and promoted allegiance among the believers because of their belief, that the new regime safely guards the sphere of the natural law. And they were mistaken, for "the political sphere, as well as common good, is a potentially all-embracing notion".[xiv]

The natural law, understood as essential law, embraces a certain minimum, which is basic and has a most general character. And in order to avoid the "contentless generality" dilemma, the attempts to supplement the natural law with relevant views and theses are frequently made. Thus, the natural law – defying the artificially ascribed to it invariability and universal character – starts to gain the traits of relativity and appears historically conditioned. And that - Bökenförde notes - contains the danger that the natural law may fall prey to ideologies and various manipulation.

The philosopher reveals the inadequacy of the argumentation based on the natural law on two major issues: of war and of private property. As for the war, the natural law necessitates two conditions for the war to be recognized "just" – a proper cause (iusta causa) and right means (modus debitus). Such preconditions may have regulated the waging of wars in the Middle Ages, but in the era of atomic weapons both the "just cause" and the "right means" have grown anachronistic. The sequential implementation of traditional law-natural categories in war issues at times brought about absurd inferences. Some, for example, justified the use of atomic weapons every time a "just cause" appears, regardless of the fact, that this could end in the annihilation of a whole people, if not the human civilization as such. Others, paying more heed to the "right means" of waging a war, in the name of the very natural law altogether opposed the idea of atomic weapons creation. In reality, that could result in the disarmament of some and the simultaneous piling up of weapons by others. Thus the principle of the "unsteady balance", acting as the only possible remedy for prolonging stability nowadays would be disrupted.

The case for the private property bears some slight likeness to the above described one. The difference is only that the inadequacy of the law-nature argumentation is proved here not by way of the conditions' anachronism, but via the absence of definite sense. The natural law in the realm of private property states only that every human being has a right to have something as his private property. While – Bökenförde says – the main problem here is not the question whether the private property exists or not (for it does exist in that way or another even in socialist and communist societies), but what are the limits of this property and in what dimension it subsists. (…) Thus, the power of the law-nature argumentation in the realm of private property ends where the real (…) problems of the implementation of what is right according to the nature, and the order of possession means dilemma in particular.[xv]

All too general a character of the law-nature conception forced the scholars seek for various "afterspecifications", but that resulted in more general and trite statements at best. Though these "afterspecifications" might sometimes be of more baneful aftermath. Such was the case of Pope Pius ХІІ and his advisor G.Gundlach concerning the engagement of workers in managing enterprises. "Both of them reiterated, that the engagement of workers in managing enterprises thwarted the natural law; such practice is totally unjustified (Pius ХІІ) or altogether intolerable (Gundlach)". The practical conclusion is as follows: human work is just an "appendage" to property; the employee is absolutely dependent on the one in possession of the means of production. "It is difficult to think of any more vivid domination of a thing over a human being" – both aptly and rightly notes Bökenförde[xvi].

The most curious in the whole story is that after the Vatican Council Pope John ХХІІІ was able to ground the rights of the workers to control the enterprise on the same natural law!

Moor, Popper, Bökenförde, Fuks, and Crysdale – the list of the natural law conception critics is by far not complete. But the critic presented here shows the necessity to revise the natural law theory and to re-deem the sphere of its implementation.

3. The revision and partial rehabilitation of the natural law

A Polish ethician, professor Jerzy Gałkowski, trying to vindicate the traditional version of the natural law, writes the following: "…the sources of law (…) are to be searched for in the reality, in the very existence – in a human being, not in the thrust mental constructions, ideas or ideologies"[xvii] – and this quotation is perhaps the best illustration of how the ethical traditionalists are committed to one and the same mistake. We can try to somehow understand his definition, taking into consideration the fact, that the cited article was written soon after the collapse of communism, the period, when human conscience was often substituted for ideology. Nevertheless, Gałkowski makes here a grave gnoseological mistake. It is not true, that we derive (or are capable of it) the principles of acting from the human nature. Even if we do, we derive it from the description of the nature, and that seriously alters the understanding of the natural law. It is not enough to state, that a principle x is "derived" from the nature, one has to reveal, that the description of the nature, on the basis of which the principle is formulated, presents an absolutely right and "universal" description. Moreover, one should not forget that there is no direct link even between a description of something and a norm – here stands an interpretation. It is not true, that we can choose between mental construct and nature, in both cases we have mental constructs. Right, the "natural law" is also a mental construct! The question is rather: what constructs - ideology or anthropology? It is here, that we can introduce the evaluation criterion, though it is not quiet easy, for anthropology can be a derivative of certain ideology or at least be akin to ideology.

Speaking about natural law, we can not ignore the "methodological dualism" – a fruit of modern philosophy: David Hume introduced the fact-value dualism; Immanuel Kant's was Sein-Sollen dualism; while Karl Popper spoke about the dualism of facts and convention or – in another wording – facts and decisions. There is a prompt division line in modern philosophy between the "world of nature" (Welt der Natur) and the "world of (cultural) milieu" (Welt der Sitten), and in this connection the new division of sciences into "natural" (Naturwissenschaften) and "spiritual" (Geisteswissenschaften – "science on spirits" to be exact) has been put forward.

Another Polish scientist, prof. Andrzej Bronk, writes, that the Hume-Kantian fact-value division and, simultaneously, that of science on the one side and ideology, metaphysics and religion on the other is backed by logical positivism, both in Carnap's and Popper's versions[xviii]. Ther